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network industry strategies
John McGee and Tanya Sammut-Bonnici
NETWORKS, STANDARDS, AND COMPETITION
Companies that operate in competitive markets
dominated by network externalities face distinct
trade-offs regarding the choice of a tech-
nical standard. Microsoft continues to develop
Windows as an operating system and to expand
its reach through technological partnerships
with manufacturers of mobile devices, such as
Nokia, Samsung, and HTC. On the other hand,
the manufacturers practice an open policy of
accommodating the dominant operating stan-
dards, which are in constant evolution and led
by Windows and Android. Apple has adhered to
its OS platform for its suite of iPod, iPad, and
iPhone products. Google has invested heavily
in the development of Android as a competing
operating standard, to secure its market power.
Microsoft’s dominant position is largely due
to collaborating with hardware manufacturers.
In its early days, Microsoft cooperated with
Intel to make Windows 95 exclusively compat-
ible with Intel x86 microprocessor architectures
and vice versa. All PCs produced with the
chip came with a complimentary installation
of the Windows operating system, which led
to an unprecedented global distribution of the
operating standard. The media coined the effect
the “Wintel Advantage.”
Holding on to a primary compatibility stan-
dard permits a firm’s product to capture the
value added by a large network. Conversely, the
firm loses direct control over the market supply
of the good and faces (direct) intra-platform
competition. Alternatively, adhering to a unique
standard permits the firm to face less or no
intra-platform competition, but it forgoes the
added value related to a large network.
This trade-off is a key strategic decision that
depends in part on the control that firms have in
making their output compatible with competi-
tors’ outputs and complementary products. The
ability to conform to a common standard opens
the opportunity to make this trade-off. Where
standards are proprietary, the decision rests
with the owner of the standard. The owner’s
trade-off is the pay-off associated with devel-
oping the existing network and its spillovers
versus the introduction of more intra-platform
competition. Essentially, the trade-off is the
same: to adhere to a common standard or to
seek uniqueness. This can be expressed as a
sequential game: at the outset, one chooses the
appropriate technical standard (and, therefore,
the network to join), and later one chooses how
to compete. Normal markets do not have this
choice of network and there are consequences for
market structure and competition in the pres-
ence of network externalities. The mathematical
model in Economides and Flyer (1997) defines
networks as coalition structures and analyzes the
stability of coalitions under different standards
regimes and varying levels of network exter-
nalities. There are a number of implications
for market structure and competition in the
presence of network externalities.
First, it is intuitively clear that industry output
will be higher when there are network external-
ities and when standards are open. Firms are
free to choose which standard to adopt and are
deterred only by the costs of adoption. When
standards are incompatible and the owners
of standards can exercise proprietary control,
incumbents are more strongly protected against
the consequences of new entrants. Moreover,
there will usually be considerable asymmetries
between firms in terms of outputs, prices, and
profits. (Under incompatibility regimes, firms
are equivalent to platforms and constitute one-
firm networks.) For pure network goods, the
asymmetries are particularly marked.
Second, in general, with total incompati-
bility of standards market concentration, output
inequality and price and profit inequality
increase with the extent of the network exter-
nality. This is an important result because it
explains why one or two firms so often dominate
network industries. The mechanism is straight-
forward. The leading network establishes its
critical mass, leaving the second network to
establish a critical mass across the remaining
untapped market coverage. The third network
follows in the same fashion, and so on. It follows
that there will be a tendency to provide large
incentives to organize customers into few plat-
forms so as to maximize the added value from
the available networks. Firms will be keen to
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abandon their own weak standards in favor of the
higher value obtainable from a leading network.
There is a third implication. Where there
are proprietary standards and strong network
effects, there is no natural equilibrium in terms
of network offerings. There are always incen-
tives for at least one firm to move to a stronger
network, and the consequence of any one move
is to shift the incentives for all other firms.
However, equilibrium can be reinforced by
the refusal of firms to make their proprietary
standards available. Again, the mechanism is
straightforward. Under strong externalities, the
owner of a standard has a considerable incentive
to exploit the standard by itself and to exclude
other firms with weaker standards. Conversely,
where the externality is weak, the owner will
find a stronger incentive to admit other firms
to its proprietary standard in order to grow
the network through collective effort and thus
generate more added value. In summary, strong
network externalities suggest the following
eventualities:
1. Larger industry output
2. Very large asymmetries between firms/
platforms
3. Likelihood of market dominance
4. Enhancement and protection of proprietary
standards
5. Equilibrium market structures that are the
reverse of the world without network exter-
nalities.
This leads directly to the fourth implication.
Competition, as we know it, can be seriously
compromised by the size consequences of
“winner takes all.” Microsoft’s continuing pres-
ence in front of the competition regulators in
the United States and in the European Union is
testament to this. The creation of a substantial
market share (a de facto monopoly) not only
leads to the possibility of monopolistic behavior
in that market but also in the potential transfer
of that position into adjacent industries. Hence
the concern that a company likeMicrosoft might
be able to create similar large market shares
in network industries (such as browsers). In
addition to the monopoly question, there is
continuing controversy about intellectual prop-
erty rights such as patents and access by smaller
firms to the knowledge bases of the larger. As the
information and communications technology
(ICT) industry is inherently global, there are
also continuing concerns about the ability of
the smaller local firms to survive against the
global players. Just what is a level playing
field is a matter of dispute. Consequently, the
competition authorities in the United States
and the European Union have paid considerable
attention to the ways in which competition in
the digital economy should be managed. The
following section outlines the more important
issues from a European perspective.
IMPLICATIONS FOR STRATEGY
There are major differences between the
economic and strategic characteristics of the
digital economy compared to the traditional
industrial order. These major differences can be
summarized as follows:
1. The information economy depends
on connectivity. Without connectivity,
consumer interdependence is indirect.
Positive feedback gives an economic law of
plenty – more gives more.
2. Upfront costs are very large and revenues
can be substantially delayed and are signifi-
cantly at risk. As a result, the nature of busi-
nessmodels is different, with higher degrees
of risk embedded in them.
3. It is also a world of immense uncertainty
where even the range of potential outcomes
is not known, but also where there is a signif-
icant probability that future technological
change might undermine an apparently
winning position.
4. The competition between rival networks/
standards can be hard to call in advance.
5. “Tippymarkets” substantially raise the level
of risk.1
In this new world, there is much more
uncertainty and companies need to take bigger
risks in order just to survive. The prospect
of entrepreneurial profits is enticingly large
but there are probably greater probabilities of
failure. The list of failures and near failures
in the last decade by large companies is very
long. There are some new strategic “rules” for
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competing in the digital economy. While these
are quite generic in nature, they illustrate that
companies need to come to these markets with a
different mindset about how to compete:
1. Expectations management is central to
the way in which marketing strategy is
conceived (see the Case Box below).
2. Open standards are the key to volume.
Protected standards are only viable as small,
high-priced niche markets. The old preoc-
cupation with protection of intellectual
property is giving way to a sharing and
cooperating approach.
3. There is a law of inverse pricing. The best
(i.e., the most valuable in the future) prod-
ucts are given away, such as Web browsers,
in order to create a consumer standard, and
sheer volume causes both marginal costs
and prices to fall over time as the product
becomes more valuable. The cash flow
machine consists of modest (even small)
margins multiplied by gigantic volumes to
defray massive investments. The machine is
volume driven and protected by very large
switching costs.
4. The first strategic choice is which network
to join (which standard to adopt). The
second, and a long way behind, is how to
compete within the network of choice.
5. Networked complementarities and cooper-
ative strategies are replacing the old order
of hierarchical business organization and
competition.
6. In a world of uncertainty, customers are also
uncertain about which standards, technolo-
gies, and products will prevail. This will
increase the power of brands and place upon
marketing the need to manage customer
expectations so as to speed adoption rates
toward tipping points in the market.
7. Post convergence and digitization, the
new ICT landscape is based on contin-
uous innovation that challenges accepted
consumption behavior and regulatory
paradigms. Industry players recommend
that, for the European Union to protect and
develop its international competitiveness in
the ICT industry, it must develop a mixture
of light-touch regulation complemented by
detailed and specific measures (directives)
to ensure a properly competitive landscape
(Sammut-Bonnici, 2009).
The economic characteristics of network
industries are dependent in large part on
the interconnectivity that is characteristic of
the technologies of information goods. Inter-
connectivity allows customers to view, use,
and link products, giving rise to networks of
customers. In these networks, powerful demand-
side increasing returns can operate. Where
consumer-based externalities are powerful,
there are strong pressures toward “winner-
takes-all” phenomena (e.g., Wintel globally,
and Sky TV in the United Kingdom). In these
circumstances, conventional economic laws are
challenged. De facto monopoly can emerge: but
uncertainty is high and markets may be intrin-
sically unstable. Successive waves of technology
may outmode old monopolies and serve as the
basis for new monopolies.
The rate of growth and now the sheer size
of the ICT industry has been the progenitor of
major changes in the economy. We have seen
major effects on other industries through the
new value possibilities that information tech-
nology offers and through the substantial fixed
costs and minimum scales required for effective
deployment of these technologies. When linked
to networks of interdependent customers, we
see the potential emergence of winner-takes-all
strategies and the emergence of newmonopolies.
We have decomposed the ICT industry into its
component parts in order to see who the players
are and how they interact with one another.
In doing this, we argue that we are beginning
to see a new type of industrial order – one
marked by networked complementarities and
cooperation in place of the traditional model
of hierarchy and competition. We have also
decomposed the industry into four horizontal
levels – technology, supply chain, platform,
and network – to show that these have different
economic characteristics and therefore that
corporate strategies have different dynamics.
The examples quoted indicate the range and
extent of the possibilities inherent in the new
technologies and in terms of rivalry in the form
of preemptive strikes and technology races.
We note, particularly, the pervasive changes
that are taking place in supply chains generally.
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The increasing importance of connectivity and
modularity is forcing a shift from the compet-
itive mode toward the cooperative mode. This
raises thoughts of self-organizing systems and
the notion of coevolution, rather a long way from
the search for and exercise of crude bargaining
power. The sheer size and cost of physical plat-
forms also create new dynamics. The pervasive
use of alliances is an obvious example. Less
obvious is how the need for interoperability
requires new attitudes toward complexity and
requirements for agility.
A new set of strategies is emerging to offset the
risks and pressures exerted by these rules. This
is visible in the setting up of global standards and
their ensuing platforms. For example, Group
Speciale Mobile, commonly known as GSM,
is an association of 600 network operators and
suppliers of the mobile phone industry. Their
primary objective is to set a common standard
for mobile communications in order to create
a homogeneous industry where equipment,
software, and networks can seamlessly talk to
each other. Strategies of standardization are
stabilizing the markets and charting the course
for research and development policies.
Finally, we remark on the significance of inter-
dependence between consumers. This effect
at its strongest completely shifts our thinking
from the prevalence of oligopolistic competition
(size matters but so do diminishing returns) to
the possibility of the winner-takes-all and the
monopoly situations (size matters – full stop).
Clearly, such network effects are not always
going to be so extreme, but there is a real possi-
bility that the combination of high fixed costs,
significant economies of scale, and high degrees
of knowledge specialization will, when taken
together with consumer bandwagons, create
massive new corporate structures to which the
major (and perhaps only) discipline will be
further developments in technology. However,
the analysis of consumer lock-in suggests the
real possibility that switching costs might inhibit
the adoption of valuable new technologies.
See also competitive market theory; critical mass;
networks; network externalities
ENDNOTES
1 “Tippy” markets are those that display poten-
tial network externalities.
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